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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff a.nd Respondenl, 
-vs.-
IRENE HEDGEBETH and 
HENRY ALLEN, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 9299 
BRIEF OF RESPO,NDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not dispute the statement of facts 
set forth in appellants' brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING 
INTO EVIDENCE STATE'S EXHIBITS A, B, C, 
D AND E. 
PoiNT II. 
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A WIT-
NESS IS CREDIBLE IS THE FUNCTION OF A 
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JURY .. AND IS .. NOT REVIEWABLE BY THh: 
APPELLATE COURT. 
PoiNT III. 
THE RECORD DOES NOT INDICATE THAT 
THE OGDEN CITY POLICE WERE ANY MORE 
BIASED OR PREJUDICED THAN ORDINARY 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. 
PoiNT IV. 
IF THERE WAS ERROR IN RECEIPT OF 
STATE'S EXHIBITS A, B, C, D AND E, IT WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING 
INTO EVIDENCE STATE'S EXHIBITS A, B, C, 
D AND E. 
(a) The initial objection raised by defendants is that 
State's Exhibit A, a wallet, was received into evidence 
'vithout clarifying whether it was found on Friday, Jan-
uary 8, 1960, or Saturday, January 9, 1960. The pertinent 
part of the transcript is as follows : 
''!Q. Mrs. Checketts, I '11 call your attention to the 
morning of January 8th just at about 10 :30 
a.m. of that day and ask you whether or not 
you had oc.acsion to go downtown here in 
Ogden. 
A. I go downtown every Saturday morning and 
purchase my groceries and do any other shop-
ping I need to, and I left home about 10:30-
MR. HENDRICKS: (interposing A.M. or P.M. Y 
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A. A.M. No grocery stores are open around town 
at 10 p.m. 
Q. Mrs. Checketts, did you later in the day return 
to your home~ 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Approximately what time~ 
A. Around a quarter after twelve at noon. 
Q. And did you at that time have occasion to go 
to your back yard, Mrs. Checketts~ 
A. Yes, I go to the back door and open it so my 
husband can bring the groceries in through it. 
Q. On this occasion as you entered your apart-
ment on the 9th, did you find anything that ap-
peared to be unusual~ 
A. As I opened the back door -
MR. HENDRICKS: (interposing) Object to the 
leading questions. * * * '' 
It is true that the prosecuting attorney framed his intial 
question concerning the date using January 8, 1960. The 
witness, however, answered that she went downtown 
every Saturday (which would have been January 9, 1960) 
without mentioning the day of the month. The prosecu-
tion later corrected the mistake when he questioned the 
witness about when she entered her apartment on Jan-
nary 9th. ( Tr. 27) 
It is improbable that a natural and innocuous slip 
caused any confusion in the minds of the jury. Defend-
ants' attorney was present and did not correct the error; 
in fact, he did not even cross-examine the witness. 
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The testimony of Officer Butcher later in the trial 
( Tr. 45) also indicated that the wallet was found on the 
9th of January, 1960. 
(b) The Trial Judge did not err in receiving Exhibit 
B in evidence. The exhibit, a cigarette lighter, was rele-
vant as it tended to establish a material proposition. 
Admitting this exhibit could not have aroused the jury's 
emotions of prejudice nor created a side issue to mislead 
the jury. A fair standard for determining the relevancy 
of evidence is set out by McCormick on Evidence ( Ch. 16, 
para 152, p. 318) : 
''Does the evidence render the inference more 
probable than it would be without the evidence~" 
Further as to the standard a judge should use in making 
the determination, McCormick states: 
''The answer must filter through the judge's ex-
perience, his judgment and his knowledge of 
human conduct and motivation." 
In Thompson v. American Steel and Wire Company, 
317 Pa. 7, 11, 175 A. 541, 1934, the court stated, speaking 
of the Judge : 
''He is constantly faced 'Yith questions on evi-
dence in their special relation to the issue to be 
tried. He must deal with such questions in the 
light of the purposes of the ultimate inquiry and 
does so in the exercise of "~hat is known as judi-
cial discretion. He should see that nothing rele-
vant is excluded so long as its admission will not 
unduly distract the attention of the jury from the 
main inquiry by first requiring the ascertainment 
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of an unnecessary quantity of subordinate facts 
from which the main inference would ultimately be 
made. His conclusion or decision on such points 
will not be interfered with on appeal save for 
manifest abuse of power.'' 
Although the complaining witness, Mr. Israelson, was 
unable to identify positively the cigarette lighter, admis-
sion of it as an exhibit was not prejudicial as it was used 
to show that at the time of the defendant, Henry Allen's, 
arrest, he had a lighter which was at least similar to the 
one taken from the complaining witness. The Court's 
decision to receive Exhibit B was made in the exercise of 
judicial discretion and the record does not indicate the 
Judge abused his power in any way. 
(c) It is true that Officer Gill failed to identify Ex-
hibit C or his initials thereon. However, Officer Butcher 
'vas present when Officer Gill obtained the bottle and 
initialed it, and a.t the trial identified the bottle by the 
initials of Officer Gill. Exhibit D, the beer bottle, could 
have been more precisely identified; nevertheless, Officer 
Butcher was present when the beer bottle was found in 
the apartment, and so testified. Since the bottle was 
introduced merely to show that a beer bottle was found 
in the apartment, it was not error to receive it. 
(d) Whether or not scientific detection was used 
is not applicable on review, as this matter would go to 
the weight of the evidence and would not affect the admis-
sibility as long as reasonable methods were followed. This 
is especially true where an attempt to obtain fingerprints 
was not made immediately after taking the exhibit into 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
custody. Th~ fact that Lt. Carver did not receive the 
exhibit until January 11, 1960, appears to have little 
impact in determining if scientific detection was used. 
PoiNT II. 
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A WIT-
NESS IS CREDIBLE IS THE FUNCTION OF A 
JURY AND IS NOT REVIEW ABLE BY THE 
APPELLATE COURT. 
The appellate court should not pass on the credibility 
of witnesses as this is a question solely for the determina-
tion of the jury or the trial court in cases tried without a 
jury, the reason being that the jury or judge who see and 
hear witnesses testify have an opportunity to observe 
their demeanor and appearance and are in a better posi-
tion to determine the credibility. In Gittens v. Lundberg, 
284 P. 2d 1115, 3 U. 2d 392, the court stated : 
"It is the duty of this court to leave the question 
of credibility of witnesses to the jury as fact trier 
and we have quite consistently adhered to that 
policy. As has often been said, the jury is in a. 
favorable position to form impressions as to the 
trust to be reposed in witnesses. They have the 
advantage of fairly close personal contact; the 
opportunity to observe appearances and general 
demeanor; and the chance to feel the impact of 
personality, all of which they may consider in con-
nection with the reactions, manner, approaches 
and apparent frankness and candor or want of it in 
reacting to and answering questions on both direct 
and cross examination in determining whether and 
to what extent witnesses are to be believed.'' 
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PoiNT III. 
THE RECORD DOES NOT INDICATE THAT 
THE OGDEN CITY POLICE WERE ANY MORE 
BIASED OR PREJUDICED THAN ORDINARY 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. 
Defendants imply that arresting defendants prior to 
finding Exhibit A, the wallet, was improper and that this 
act prejudiced defendants. This position is untenable. 
The record before the Court contains nothing which even 
suggests that finding the wallet was the justification for 
defendants' arrest. The fact that the wallet was the only 
exhibit at the preliminary hearing has no bearing on the 
arrest. Defendants' statements regarding the enmity 
between the defendants and Officer Butcher is an extra-
neous issue and is outside the scope of this appeal as this 
issue was not raised in the trial court. While it is admitted 
that certain procedures of the investigating officers could 
have been improved, there is nothing in the record which 
indjcates that the defendants have been preudiced. Vol-
ume 30, C. J. S., Sec. 103lb, page 1073, sets forth the gen-
eral law on bias as follows : 
''The interest or bias of a witness, or the absence 
thereof, may be considered as affecting the weight 
of his testimony, the weight of the testimony of an 
intereste witness, depending largely on the facts 
in each case. So where a party testifies as a wit-
ness his interest in the outcome or the cause may 
and should be considered in determining proba-
tive value of his testimony. However, the interest 
or bias of a witness does not ipso fact wholly de-
prive his testimony of probative force.'' 
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PoiNT IV. 
IF THERE WAS ERROR IN RECEIPT OF 
STATE'S EXHffiiTS A, B, C, D AND E, IT WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
5A C. J. S., para. 1724, page 945, states: 
''A judgment will not be reversed because of the 
erroneous admission of evidence where it did not, 
or probably did not, affect the result, conclusion, 
udgment or verdict or could not have done so, or 
was not reasonably calculated to cause a result 
unfair to the complaining party or was not of such 
a character to reasonably tend to cause the rendi-
tion of an improper verdict or could not have 
materially affected decisive issues, or could not 
have misled, confused, influenced or prejudiced 
the minds of the jury.'' 
Respondent contends that there was no error in re-
ceiving the exhibits in question, but if there were, defend-
ants have not been prejudiced. In the case of the wallet, 
had the jury believed it had been found the day prior to 
the incident, the respondent's case certaintly would have 
been weakened, which would have been advantageous to 
the defendants. The bottles were not properly identified 
by the particular officer who marked them; however, 
Officer Butcher did testify that he was present and that 
he and Officer Gill jointly obtained the bottles. There 
was no positive identification of the cigarette lighter and 
the attorney for the defendants called this fact to the 
jury's attention. Receiving the money as evidence had 
probative value and was used only for the purpose of 
showing that one of the defendants had money on his 
person. 
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CONCLUSION 
The record on appeal does not indicate that any of 
the evidence admitted unlawfully prejudiced the defend-
ants. The latter, entirely within their rights, failed to 
testify, thereby waiving an opportunity to clarify any 
issue which might have been offensive to their position. 
There appears to be some question as to the force used 
against Israelson and as to whether or not he was actually 
placed in fear, and also as to his sobriety on the evening 
in question. However, we do not feel that the Court com-
mitted prejudicial error in its conduct of the trial and it is 
the function of the jury to make its decision as to 
guilt or innocence. 
Respectfully submitted 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
CLARENCE J. FROST 
Assista;n.t Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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